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THE USE OF ACCOUNTING 
INFORMATION IN GOVERNMENTAL 
REGULATION AND PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION: THE IMPACT OF 
JOHN R. COMMONS AND EARLY 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMISTS 
Abstract: This paper examines the socio-political process by which an 
ensemble of such calculative practices and techniques as accounting 
came to be developed, adopted, and justified within turn-of-the-cen-
tury public administration. We are particularly concerned with exam-
ining the influence of John R. Commons and other early institutional 
economists during this Progressive era. Using primary and secondary 
archival materials, our purpose is to make three main contributions 
to the literature. First, the paper explores Commons' contribution to 
the debates over "value" which seems to be somewhat unique in that 
he explicitly recognized that there exists no unproblematic, intrinsic 
measure of value, but rather that it must be socially constituted as 
"reasonable" with reference to common law. To illustrate this point, 
this paper explores Commons' role in the historical development and 
implementation of rate of return regulation for utilities. Second, the 
paper describes the contradictory role accounting played during this 
period in ostensibly fostering administrative objectivity while accom-
modating a more pragmatic rhetoric of "realpolitik" in its develop-
ment and deployment. The third contribution is to establish a linkage 
between current work in economics and accounting concerned with 
utility regulation and the debates of ninety years ago, noting that 
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Commons' contribution has not been fully explored or recognized 
within the accounting literature. 
INTRODUCTION 
A myriad of such social innovations as workmen's compen-
sation, social security, unemployment insurance, and utility and 
industrial regulation had their origins within the combined in-
tellectual/political base of John R. Commons ' inst i tut ional 
school of economics at the University of Wisconsin, and Gover-
nor Robert La Follette's Progressive party in the State of Wis-
consin. Wisconsin's efforts, in turn, became the epicenter of 
socio-public administrative experimentation and served as a 
model for reform by other states and the federal government 
[Roosevelt, 1912, pp. v-ix; Kolko, 1963, pp. 212-216]. The stated 
purposes of this combined intellectual/political base were to 
modify the government's role in response to changing social as 
well as technical/industrial conditions, and simultaneously en-
gender and benefit from the efficient administration of the 
American political economy. 
Hays [1959, pp. 261-276] has suggested that the turn-of-the-
century Progressive movement attracted institutional econo-
mists like John R. Commons who advocated the "rational" de-
ployment of public resources, supported by a complex of such 
rationalizing techniques as accounting, to solve broad social 
problems. This movement served to legitimize a system of deci-
sion making based on calculated criteria thought to be objective, 
rational and above the give-and-take of political maneuvering. It 
made the political seem apolitical [Rose, 1977, pp. 68-71]; it 
took the debatable beyond the realm of open debate [Hopwood, 
1984, pp. 170-176]; and it differentiated the political and im-
moral from the objective and merely factual [Zucker, 1977, pp. 
733-738; Miller and O'Leary, 1990, pp. 492-498]. This movement 
sought to substitute and legitimize one system of decision-mak-
ing — the one inherent in the spirit of modern science, technol-
ogy and business — for another — the one inherent in stylized 
but subjective exchanges among overtly political social actors. 
Decision making and control became a more calculative, 
procedurally-oriented process, involving measurement and pre-
diction, that invoked business techniques for directing the 
course of events toward predictable and stable outcomes [Kolko, 
1963, pp. 1-10]. This shift moved decision making away from 
the local government to the larger networks of human interac-
tion, and it achieved more than legitimate a new form of deci-
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sion making; it also transferred power to the central executive 
office [Wilson, 1956, pp. 88-117]. As Hays [1959, pp. 261-276] 
suggested, an examination of the Progressive movement illumi-
nates not so much the content of public policy, but the nature of 
the resulting political structure and the types of interactions pe-
culiar to it. 
The primary purpose of our paper is to trace the intellectual 
underpinnings of John R. Commons' institutional economics in 
order to appreciate the impact of Commons' work on the use of 
accounting information in turn-of-the-century governmental 
regulation and public administration.1 It is proposed that John 
Commons joined such other pragmatists of the era as John 
Dewey [1910, 1922] and Thorstein Veblen [1904, 1919] to cri-
tique the inequities created by the concentration of wealth dur-
ing the late nineteenth century, as embodied in such monopolies 
as railroads and utilities. However, departing both from prag-
matists who contended that the "pecuniary calculus of account-
ing" was dysfunctional to the interests of society [e.g., Merino, 
1993, p. 164] and from propriety theorists of the era who dis-
claimed responsibility for the concept of "value", Commons 
[e.g., 1907a, pp. 1-18; 1910, pp. 215-217] sought to abstract ac-
counting practice from the private sector, transform it by devel-
oping the concept of "reasonable value" and the corresponding 
"rate of return," and then apply them to the regulate private 
sector monopolies which he saw as harmful but necessary. 
The remainder of this paper is organized into three sec-
t ions. Within the first section, Commons ' work is briefly 
contextualized with reference to neo-classical economics, and 
other pragmatists and accounting theorists of the Progressive 
era. This contextualization of Commons' work also details Com-
mons' approach to institutional economics and its relationship 
to the Social Gospel Movement. In section two, we describe and 
problematize Commons' concepts of physical valuation and rate 
1
 Although a comprehensive analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, 
Commons' writings span a range of matters which may be broadly classified as 
dealing with the question of governance. In Proportional Representation and Rep-
resentative Democracy [1900] he dealt with the question of political order (i.e., 
representation in government); in A Sociological Theory of Sovereignty [1965], 
Social Reform and the Church [1894], and Races and Immigrants in America 
[1920], he dealt with the question of social order (i.e., institutional modifications 
to the corrosive aspects of self-interests, etc.); in The Distribution of Wealth 
[1893], Legal Foundations of Capitalism [1924], Institutional Economics [1934], 
and Industrial Goodwill [1919], he dealt with the question of industrial/economic 
order (i.e., transactions, private property, regulations). 
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of return as applied to the regulation of utilities; this section 
concludes with a theoretical interpretation of Commons' regula-
tory efforts in terms of the "orthodox administrat ion" and 
"realpolitik" forms of political rhetoric. Finally, section three 
offers concluding comments. 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND 
ACCOUNTING THEORY 
The institutional approach to addressing economic prob-
lems was concerned with overcoming the limitations of the neo-
classical model and its inability to provide insight as to the 
crucial social and organizational problems of the time. In par-
ticular, institutional economics stressed the dynamic socio-po-
litical, institutional factors influencing economic life in the be-
lief that the neo-classical model was almost totally inappropriate 
to the analysis of social change and the role of institutions in 
society [Jepperson, 1992, pp. 150-156].2 In response to the limi-
tations of neo-classical economics, institutional economists 
sought to understand the mechanisms by which social and eco-
nomic actions were carried out, but saw political, social and 
economic behavior as something more than merely the aggre-
gate consequences of individual activities. The institutional 
school of economics was united by a common conviction that 
institutional arrangements and social processes matter. It is the 
analysis of change, particularly analysis of the changing social 
and organizational forces at the turn-of-the-century, which mo-
tivated the institutional approach to the study of economic 
problems. 
On this theme, and specifically related to accounting, Me-
rino [1993, pp. 163-165] credited institutional economists, and 
such related Progressive era pragmatists as Dewey [e.g., 1910, 
1922] and Veblen [e.g., 1904, 1919], for recognizing that the 
2
 Basically, in neo-classical economics, price equals exchange value, which 
results from the interaction between demand and supply. Monopolies are inher-
ently anti-competitive and charge monopoly prices, thus subverting the public 
good: private vices do not lead to public benefits. In contrast, for Commons, 
price equals "reasonable value" which results from the interaction between de-
mand and supply as augmented by negotiations. Thus, to correct monopolistic 
ills, negotiation between monopolies and regulators and/or its judicial system is 
necessary in order to produce a "reasonable value" [Commons in Dorfman, 
1964, pp. 18-35]. Moreover, this distinction is parallel to DR Scott's [1931, pp. 
34-61] notion of market control versus accounting control, since the latter is the 
basis for the courts' decisions. 
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"pecuniary calculus of accounting" provided economic generali-
zations which served as systems of rationalization for the on-
going system of economic power embedded in the oligopolistic 
markets of the time. This recognition stands in stark contrast to 
that of traditional accounting theorists who, as Merino [1993, 
pp. 163-165] argued, faced a formidable task: they had to recon-
cile traditional accounting profit measurement, based on indi-
vidualistic economic theories, with an emerging corporate 
economy. Traditional accounting discourse as to profit measure-
ment revealed an unquestioning acceptance of neo-classical eco-
nomic theory and implicitly supported the premise that compe-
t i t ion would ensure survival of the fittest, as faithfully 
represented by accounting profit. Accounting sought scientific 
status by claiming to be an objective reporter of economic real-
ity, depicting exchange prices, the basic data of accounting, as 
factual. Institutional economists, in turn, proposed that such 
notions as accounting profit were flawed by the implicit embed-
ding of organized interests, and that neo-classical economics 
had taken for granted the very phenomena that needed to be 
systematically examined: the role of institutional structure, such 
as economic or accounting information, in preserving the status 
quo in power relations, or in the creation and legitimization of 
alternative social and organization ideologies and processes. 
Merino [1993, pp. 175-176] made the provocative point that 
the key issue is not institutional economists' critique of neo-
classical economics, per se, but whether the traditional account-
ing theorists' neo-classical framework merely represented a fail-
u r e to r e c o g n i z e t he i n c o n s i s t e n c y b e t w e e n u n c r i t i c a l 
acceptance of laissez-faire economics and their claim to objec-
tivity, or whether the acceptance of this framework stood for 
something more insidious — the possibility that neo-classical 
economists and related accounting theorists consciously devised 
a discourse that supported the position of stockholders/owners 
and strengthened the authority of those who controlled financial 
resources (for example, monopolies), and consciously relied on 
an assumption they knew was false in order to justify traditional 
profit measurement. 
This question which Merino [1993, pp. 175-176] posed as to 
neo-classical economics and traditional accounting theory also 
needs to be asked of institutional economics to fully appreciate 
its influence as well as the specific work of John Commons. On 
this point, Hoksbergen [1994, pp. 705-708] reasoned that institu-
tional economics suffers from a failure to recognize its own 
5
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internal inconsistencies. As stated earlier, institutional econo-
mists were united by their common conviction that institutional 
arrangements and social processes matter, and their related cri-
tique of neo-classical economics' adherence to universal objec-
tivity, facts and certainty. Hoksbergen [1994, p. 707], however, 
argued that despite their criticism of neo-classical economics for 
staking claim to universal objectivity, there has been a tendency 
for institutional economists "to see itself as a rival and poten-
tially a superseding competitor to neoclassical economics . . . 
trying to call on some meta-theoretical extrinsic criterion to 
prove to itself and others that its economics is superior to oth-
ers. . . . " This point of view is indeed evident in Richard T. Ely's 
[1931, p.9] (early University of Wisconsin institutional econo-
mist, and colleague and mentor of Commons) reflection on his 
work: 
I have always recognized that we do not have "natural 
law" in the economic world, but rather "social law". . . . 
Nevertheless, I felt that I had discovered an economic 
law which closely resembled the laws of nature in the 
regularity with which it operated. I thought that we 
could predict how some of these economic laws would 
operate with almost the certainty with which we could 
predict the operation of the laws of the physical uni-
verse. 
Thus, as Hoksbergen [1994, pp. 705-708] suggested and 
consistent with Merino's [1993, pp. 175-176] position, institu-
tional economics may also suffer from problems in its failure to 
recognize the inherent contradictions in the development of its 
intellectual base. Similarly, Kolko [1963, pp. 212-216] was quite 
critical of institutional economists on this point, arguing that 
Veblen was the only institutional economist who recognized this 
contradiction and that institutional economics itself served the 
conservative political capitalism of the Progressive era. There-
fore, institutional economics is more than just a voice of dissent 
against neo-classical economics and related traditional account-
ing theory. It is instead an important intellectual base which 
itself needs clarification in an effort to understand its impact on 
the development of accounting theory and practice. 
John R. Commons' Approach to Institutional Economics 
John R. Commons' theory of institutional economics at-
tempted to define social behavior in terms of how we create 
6
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 22 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss1/2
Covaleski, Dirsmith, and Samuel: The Impact of John R. Commons 7 
institutional structures and techniques to resolve conflicts of 
interest, as well as establish regulations concerning governmen-
tal-industrial relations [Harter, 1962, p . 212]. A common thread 
between the work of Commons and other pragmatists of the era 
such as Dewey and Veblen was that their respective works can 
be characterized as voices of dissent. Both Commons and 
Veblen were concerned with the rapid economic changes they 
and their generation witnessed, and both believed that the tasks 
of economics included the explanation for, the development of 
monopolies, and how they might be directed toward serving 
society. While Commons evolution stressed institutional adapta-
tion to changing conditions, Veblen emphasized the reverse — 
that institutions actually inhibit adaptation to change. Com-
mons evolutionary view provided him with incentives to be an 
active reformer within government, while Veblen largely re-
mained an external critic [Horwitz, 1992, pp. 145-167]. 
The reformist approach can be found in Commons' earlier, 
predominantly industrial relations work. Because he believed 
monopoly was inevitable, Commons did not intend to have soci-
ety suppress it; rather, he intended to protect members of the 
community from its abuses through regulation. Commons' strat-
egy for social reform consisted of formulating adaptations of 
economic institutions within capitalistic systems in such a way 
that the business community would have economic incentives to 
improve the conditions of the working class. For example, in his 
book History of Labor [1921, pp. 40-64], and as influenced by his 
contacts with such labor leaders as Samuel Gompers who op-
posed radical change, Commons generally portrayed unions as 
organizations which are compatible with the capitalistic system, 
while unions having revolutionary posture were pictured as de-
viations from the norm. 
One of the critical aspects of both Commons' and Veblen's 
work pertained to the evolutionary theory of value founded on 
the habits and customs of social life. Although Veblen had not 
used court decisions in his work, Commons found them a rich 
source. Commons maintained that in the development of com-
mon law, many customs are tested for survival. In an economic 
evolution, new forms of behavior develop in response to new 
needs and opportunities. Many of these new forms give rise to 
conflicts which must be settled by the courts. Those that are 
"reasonable" or "good" in the eyes of the law are accepted, while 
those that are "unreasonable" or "bad" are suppressed. Thus, 
case by case, common law produces standards for social and 
7
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economic behavior [Horwitz, 1992, pp. 145-167]. Hence, Com-
mons' study of the development of the country's economic sys-
tem was to a considerable extent a history of common law, and 
involves examination of the social construction of norms, laws 
and regulatory mechanisms, as opposed to the identification of 
universal intrinsics [Horwitz, 1992, pp. 145-167; Hoksbergen, 
1994, pp. 705-708]. 
Much of Commons' interest in the legal aspects of econom-
ics goes back to his teacher at Johns Hopkins University, Rich-
ard Ely, and German scholars. His focus was placed on the 
entire social environment of an economy. One fellow classmate 
of Commons in the late 1870s, Woodrow Wilson, initially con-
sidered Ely "somewhat too radical" in terms of his progressive 
ideas, ideas which Wilson later espoused in the beginning of his 
political career at the turn-or-the-century [Wilson, 1956, pp. 88-
117]. Not only did Ely send Commons on extensive projects as a 
caseworker for charitable organizations, but he also convinced 
him to study problems from an historical perspective using 
"facts".3 
Specifically, Ely's views on monopolies are critical and 
prove particularly influential when Ely moved to and later hired 
Commons as a faculty member at the University of Wisconsin. 
As Ely [1931, pp. 3 &6] stated: 
I propose now to state my views, not only in regard to 
municipal ownership of public utilities, but the owner-
ship of other industries like railways which are, by rea-
son of their inherent qualities, monopolies. For indus-
tries of this sort, I used at first the term "natural 
monopolies". . . . Now, what were we to do with natural 
monopolies? Public regulation of private monopolies 
did not look to me at that time very promising. On the 
other hand, it [regulation] appeared to me to be a 
source of great evil because there was always danger 
that those who were to be controlled would, themselves 
gain control of the agency of control. . . . It seemed to 
me that if we sharply defined the field of our industries 
into those that were competitive and those that were 
monopolies; and left to private ownership and initiative 
the competitive industries and had public ownership 
3
 Ely had studied economics in Germany under the German Historical 
School, emphasizing that historical, statistical and other studies accumulating 
facts should be given more attention. Commons adopted both Ely's inductive 
approach as well as Ely's humanitarian attitudes. 
8
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and operations of the natural monopolies, we would 
have an ideal situation. That would establish, I thought, 
a harmony of interests. 
Two important aspects of Ely's view and their relationship 
to Commons' work are worth noting. First, is the acceptance of 
monopolies as "natural", which, in turn, argues for their control, 
not dissolution — a view which permeates Commons' later regu-
latory efforts. Second, Ely advocates public control and public 
ownership of these natural monopolies — a view which might 
be considered more liberal than Commons' eventual view which 
advocated public control and private ownership.4 However, Ely's 
efforts to import Germany's approach into the U.S. gave way to 
the reality of American culture, much in the manner advocated 
by Commons. As Ely [1931, pp. 15, 16, 20] stated: 
Now when it comes to public ownership of natural mo-
nopolies things have not turned out as I anticipated 
they would. . . . Government becomes more and more 
significant on its economic side, but there is not a cor-
responding general interest in public administration, 
and a correspondonly increase in comprehension of its 
significance. The great mass of the people are inter-
ested in games, base-ball especially and foot-ball. . . . It 
is obvious that the American people are determined, 
first of all, to try out the commission control of private 
industry, rather than public ownership. 
Ely's views were also influenced by socialist efforts in En-
gland at the time. Extensive, twenty-seven years of correspon-
dence between Sidney Webb reflect this influence. Much of Ely's 
correspondence with Webb revolved around Ely's book Political 
4
 Clearly Ely's [1931, p. 15] views were very much influenced by his German 
background as he stated: 
I thought that human nature, such as it is found in our country and in 
modern civilization, would respond to public ownership of natural mo-
nopolies with all its implications. I thought that we would remove the 
source of corruption, and certainly at the time I was writing, these 
sources of corruption were very largely connected with private owner-
ship of natural monopolies. I thought that if we could have public 
ownership and operation of natural monopolies, we would have pure 
government; we would have excellent operation of these natural mo-
nopolies through a highly trained and capable civil service in the na-
tion, state, and city . . . I had it in mind that we would approximate the 
excellence of the civil service in Germany where . . . they enjoy security 
of tenure and where special excellence is honored by generous recogni-
tion of those in control of government. 
9
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Economy [1889]. Webb gave Ely much feedback on the chapter 
on Socialism, and Webb was also instrumental in finding a pub-
lisher in England [Correspondence archived at the Wisconsin His-
torical Society, 12/21/1888; 2/1/1889; 3/3/1889; 3/19/1889; 3/31/ 
1891; 1/22/1892; 9/19/1892; 2/21/1894]. As Webb [12/21/88] 
wrote to Ely on a planned trip to Baltimore with Edward Pease 
of the socialist Fabian Society: 
[The Fabian Society] would be glad to permit some 
conversation with you, especially as to the progress and 
prospect of the Socialist idea in America, and as we are 
both in the center of the English Socialist movement we 
could perhaps give you some details of interest. 
This relationship between Webb and Ely, revolving around a 
sharing of socialist ideas, and later with a more conservative 
Commons, contributed to the basis of the "Wisconsin Idea" 
which advocated the expansion of the State's functions to safe-
guard the well-being of its citizens and the conscription of ex-
perts to identify the needs of the people, and then devise and 
administer reform policies to serve these needs.5 
The Social Gospel and Progressivism 
Early expressions of Progressive thought were based upon 
and yet extended beyond conceptualizations of morality within 
organized religions. Like many Progressives, John Commons 
and Richard Ely were part of the Social Gospel movement 
which rejected the orthodox Christian position that man is in-
nately sinful. It maintained that human nature is essentially 
good, but is undermined by a corrupt society. The social gospel-
ers generally sought to restore, if not reverse what they thought 
were the unnecessary consequences of industrialization, urban-
ization and the expansion of technology. Their avowed goal was 
to "christianize business, industry, politics, and the city's immi-
grant populations, all of which [were] regarded as the major, 
unregenerated spheres of society" of which "business was de-
clared to be the most significant unregenerate institution within 
5Concerning Progressivism's reliance on experts, we do not mean to imply 
that only to Progressives or the U.S in general relied on expertise. For example, 
slightly predating John R. Commons' work, Sidney and Beatrice Webb [1902a, 
1902b], who entertained Commons during his National Civic Federation work 
[Commons, 1934, p. 114], were espousing a theory wherein experts drawing 
upon an impartial, scientifically derived knowledge-base, could assist labor in 
elevating its stature and financial well being. 
10
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the American social order" [Mills, 1943, pp. 168-173; Greek, 
1992, pp. 56-58]. The gospelers believed that man [sic] "by using 
his intellect can remake society, that he can become the creator 
of a world organized for man's advantage" [Woodrow Wilson, in 
Waldo 1948, p. 16], and that conscious social action would 
eradicate sin and hasten the coming of God's kingdom, and, 
consequently, would promote social reforms to "purify Ameri-
can society" [Woodrow Wilson, in Waldo, 1948, p. 58]. 
It is with this emphasis of the social that the moral dimen-
sion of the Progressive interventionist strategy of changing the 
processes of government was founded [Hamilton and Sutton, 
1989]. After having established the preeminence of social salva-
tion, the next step in legitimating the interventionist strategy 
was to displace the importance of natural law, God or the ethi-
cal, responsible behavior of the individual, in favor of an experi-
ential grounding in such social groups as organizations. In turn, 
social reforms comprising the interventionist strategies could 
express societal values and goals in a way amenable to their 
accomplishment by bureaucracies. But here, the operational-
ization or encoding of societal goals and values within the for-
mal structure of organizations could be accomplished only by 
such experts as public administration scientists and sociologists 
"who took up the idea of organization as a banner" during this 
era [Hamilton and Sutton, 1989, p. 13]. In turn, the act of orga-
nization was seen by Progressives as an ethical act and hence 
organization became a goal in-of-itself [Hamilton and Sutton, 
1989, p.15]. 
Indeed, the melding of the religious and the political by the 
Progressives led Hofstatder [1955, p. 320] to remark that "the 
key words of Progressivism were terms like patriotism, citizen, 
democracy, law, character, conscience, soul, morals, service, 
duty, shame, disgrace, sin, and selfishness." The resulting ethos, 
in turn, directed such Progressives as Commons to channel their 
energies towards the common goal of forming an ideal democ-
racy populated by an informed and sovereign citizenry, and 
guided by conscious and redemptive human action, wherein 
business and politics were harnessed in the service of society 
and the individual [Kolko, 1963, pp. 34-61]. 
Summary 
Merino [1993, pp. 163-165] credits institutional economists 
for recognizing the limitations of neo-classical economics and 
related traditional accounting theory. She also asked the ques-
11
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tion of whether traditional accountants were oblivious to the 
inherent contradiction in their claim to objectivity and uncriti-
cal acceptance of neo-classical economics, or whether this con-
tradiction represented an effort to preserve the status quo in 
power relations among competing interests. Hoksbergen [1994, 
pp. 705-708], in turn, recognized that a major part of the devel-
opment of institutional economics was accomplished by a fac-
tion that claimed superiority over neo-classical economics by 
searching for universal laws able to gauged by external criteria 
or "facts". This faction is most apparent in the "Wisconsin 
School", the reformist Progressive party, and the Social Gospel 
movement — with which John Commons was also significantly 
involved. Hoksbergen [1994, pp. 705-708] also identified an in-
herent contradiction in the reformist effort of institutional eco-
nomics and the intellectual underpinnings of inst i tut ional 
economists. This apparent inherent contradiction in the efforts 
and work of John Commons begs Merino's query as to the power 
and politics of the development of a significant knowledge base 
be re-visited. As Kolko [ 1963, pp. 15, 214, 215, 3] argued: 
Richard T. Ely, for example, maintained that large-scale 
business was inevitable, but that, save for certain types 
of services, monopolies in the pure sense were not pre-
ordained; the burden of his writing was concerned with 
the desirability of government regulation of "artificial" 
monopolies that had sprung up rather than with regula-
tion as a means for restoring purely competitive condi-
tions . . . [t]he idealization of the state was also the 
result of the peculiar training of many of the American 
academics of this period. At the end of the 19th century 
the primary influence in American social and economic 
theory was exerted by German universities. The Bis-
marckian idealization of the state, with its centralized 
welfare functions designed to preserve capitalism and 
the status quo in its more fundamental aspects, was 
suitably revised by the thousands of key academics who 
studied in German universities in the 1880s and 1890s. 
. . . Conservative in their ends, as were big business ad-
vocates, the academics who proposed economic re-
forms failed to understand the process of political capi-
talism. Instead, the pressures and leverage created by 
their ideas helped make political capitalism possible. 
. . . It is business control over politics rather than politi-
cal regulation of the economy that is the significant 
phenomenon of the Progressive era. Political capitalism 
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is the utilization of political outlets to attain conditions 
of stability, predictability, and security — to attain ra-
tionalization — in the economy. 
A key question is whether Commons also fell prey to the 
positive quest for universal laws of economics reliant on "pure 
facts", or whether his involvement with regulatory reform was 
more reflexive in nature. 
PHYSICAL VALUATION AND 
RATE OF RETURN REGULATION 
Relying upon the landmark Munn v. Illinois [1877] case in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Illinois' right to regulate 
the "exploitive" prices charged to customers by a private sector 
company, Governor Robert La Follette attempted to regulate 
two major Wisconsin industries — railroads and utilities.6 Con-
cerning the former, La Follette introduced an eventually suc-
cessful Railroad Regulation Bill in 1905 that established the 
Railroad Commission. This commission based its efforts on the 
earlier work of Henry Carter Adams [for example, 1887, 1903, 
1918], the first statistician of the U.S. Interstate Commerce 
Commission who devised an accounting system that detailed 
railroad revenue, expenses and earnings which served as a basis 
for much subsequent federal regulation [Churchman, 1976, pp. 
6Another lawsuit of this era having a less effect on Wisconsin's regulatory 
efforts though it is relevant to contextualizing Commons' work is Smyth vs. 
Ames [1898]. This case related to a de-physicalized notion of property wherein 
government regulations were adjudicated as to the "reasonableness" of railroad 
rates using "fair' value measures, increasingly market values. The focus of the 
court was to balance granting government enough power to regulate while 
guarding against implicit confiscation of property. Smyth vs. Ames specifically 
established a set of multiple factors for ascertaining reasonableness values, al-
though these factors proved unwieldy in their application [Horwitz, 1992, p. 
160]. Alternatively, Siegel [1987, pp. 243-247] interpreted this case as serving as 
the foundation for adopting "reproduction cost" (or market value) applied in the 
1920's, a concept Commons [1924, pp. 64-82] later criticized as circular in that 
assets associated with higher rates of return will have higher reproduction costs, 
or market value, which will in turn justify higher rates. Another related case 
following Wisconsin's 1907 law was the Mann — Elkins Act of 1910 which 
empowered the Interstate Commerce Commission to effectively regulate rail-
roads. In part, the act placed the burden of persuasion on carriers to establish 
the "reasonableness" of the amount sought for rates; however, the I.C.C. had 
difficulty in imposing this act on industries other than railroads [Smith, 1958, 
pp. 239-242, 363]. 
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42-65]. Milo Maltbie [1901, pp. 39-51] eventually transformed 
this system into the pioneering uniform system of accounts, 
which served as a tool for the general social control of private 
enterprise [Trebing, 1984, pp. 232-239; Ulen, 1980, pp. 306-308]. 
In Wisconsin, La Follette's Railroad Commission sought to regu-
late rail pricing by devising an "accounting rate of return" 
mechanism for gauging what would be a "fair" return on in-
vested capital for railroads. 
In turn, this basic approach was specifically emulated and 
mobilized by Commons, who La Follette chose to draft what 
would become the Wisconsin Public Utility Law of 1907 [Com-
mons, 1934, p. 126].7 As eventually administered by the Railroad 
Commission, the Public Utility Law employed an "objective rate 
of return model" (which subsequently became known as the 
"cost plus pricing regime") for regulating rates charged to cus-
tomers of Wisconsin's electric utilities. Because of Commons', 
La Follette's, and Wisconsin's visibility and success in the Pro-
gressive reform efforts, components of the 1907 Law vis-a-vis 
accounting rate of return regulation gained rapid acceptance in 
at least 29 states and the federal government by 1913, and in-
deed impacted utility regulation for most of the twentieth cen-
tury [Trebing, 1984, pp. 232.239]. 
It is perhaps important to note that Commons and Adams 
saw such monopolies as utilities and railroads as "natural" in 
the sense that they embodied the economic "law" of increasing 
returns from economies to scale. In this view, monopolies could 
not be abolished because this would ultimately harm the public. 
Instead, they must be regulated. Thus, Commons and Adams 
saw as necessary a dismantling of the liberal ideal of a strict 
partitioning of civil society from the state in the sense that the 
state had to regulate the private sector. According to Adams 
[1887, p. 64], "For all industries which conform to the principle 
of increasing returns, the only question at issue is whether soci-
ety shall support an irresponsible, extra-legal monopoly, or a 
7
 Commons had earlier been part of the National Civic Federation which had 
investigate the operations of public utilities in the United States with reference 
to prior efforts in England. Commons' part in the investigation centered on 
examining labor issues, but he had visited so many utility companies that he had 
acquired both the interest and knowledge in the public utility field. Commons 
came to think of his reform efforts as institutional adjustments that could make 
the economic system of utilities more workable [Commons, 1934, pp. 112-130]. 
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monopoly established by law and managed in the interest of the 
public."8 In order to effectively regulate such natural monopo-
lies, it was necessary to render the private public, i.e., visible to 
public sector regulators if not the public. It is in this capacity of 
rendering the private public that accounting was to be invoked. 
The Regulation of Utilities 
The notion of "reasonable value" was the critical element in 
the Wisconsin Public Utility Law of 1907. Here, an accounting 
rate of return on a company's assets (or rate base) is based upon 
the concept of "physical valuation" which Commons [1907b, pp. 
221-222; 1910, pp. 215-217; 1913, pp. 291-292] saw as essential 
in drafting the Wisconsin law. The concept of physical valuation 
serves as the foundation for setting prices, which are intended 
by regulators to allow utilities to earn their cost of capital on the 
depreciated, original cost of their assets, as well as recover their 
operating costs [Mereba, 1994, pp. 52-65]. In Commons' opin-
ion, the best method would be to tie the rates to a "reasonable 
return" on the value of invested capital. As such, "the accounting 
system is the central endogenous variable available to regulators 
in the context of rate of regulation. [I]t is through accounting 
procedures that wealth is distributed [among] groups and elec-
tricity rates are set" [Jarrell, 1979, p. 105]. Accordingly, account-
ing could no longer disclaim responsibility for the concept of 
valuation by claiming to be merely representing "natural" facts 
relating to "natural" monopolies. Indeed, Commons' definition 
of "fair rate of return" remains a basis for industry regulation 
and a focus for academic research in economics and accounting 
8
 As suggested earlier, this view and perpetuation of monopolies as "natural" 
economic entities has a legacy in the work of Commons' mentor — Richard Ely. 
In turn, Ely was also a colleague of economist Henry C. Adams as the two of 
them were co-founders of the American Economic Association in their efforts to 
find an outlet to accommodate their intellectual perspective [Kolko, 1963, p. 15]. 
Furthermore, this view as to the natural status of monopolies predates the work 
of Ely, Commons and Henry C. Adams in the work of Charles Francis Adams, Jr. 
As Kolko [1963, p. 14] points out, at least a decade before the work of those 
institutional economists: 
Charles Francis Adams, Jr., president of the Union Pacific railroad from 
1884-1890 [and founder of the Massachusetts Railroad Commission 
which influenced the formation of the I.C.C.], was announcing that "the 
principle of consolidation . . . is a necessity — a natural law of growth. 
You may not like it; you will have to reconcile yourselves to it." "The 
law is invariable. It knows no exceptions." 
15
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[illustrative of recent works include, Sappington, 1980, pp. 363-
370; Baron and Myerson, 1982, pp. 911-915; Abdel-khalik, 1988, 
pp. 44-62; Lanen and Larcker, 1992, pp. 208-228]. 
As previously noted, Harter [1962] suggested that in order 
to learn the meaning of the concept of "reasonable value" Com-
mons turned to the study of common law, which institutional 
economists maintained was the means by which many societal 
habits and customs become encoded in a governance structure. 
Commons attributed his notion of reasonable value to state 
Senator A. W. Sanborn from whom Commons obtained the idea 
that legal valuations were oriented toward the future [Horwitz, 
1992, pp. 145-167]. As Commons [1934, p. 123] stated, "From 
this starting point, I worked for many years in making futurity 
the main principle of [institutional] economics, distinguished 
from all other schools of economic thought." In an evolving 
economic-political system, new forms of social behavior emerge 
in response to new needs or opportunities, and these new forms 
give rise to conflicts which must be resolved by the courts. 
Those forms that are "reasonable" or good in the eyes of the 
court are accepted, while those that are "unreasonable" or bad 
are suppressed. As Commons [1924, p.vii] explained, 
From the Court decisions it seemed that anything "rea-
sonable" would be sustained, and so we had to use the 
words "reasonable value" . . . whether we knew what it 
meant or not. 
Reasonable value, in turn, represents both an upper and 
lower limit of value as implicitly established by the American 
judiciary [Commons in Dorfman, 1964, pp. 18-25]. It is identifi-
able not as reflecting or seeking to reflect some notion of objec-
tive worth, but merely as "good" or "viable" in the eyes of com-
peting parties in a court of law. Thus, case by case, common law 
produces standards for gauging economic behavior [Harter, 
1962, p. 219]. According to Commons [1934, p. 156, 160; empha-
sis added]: 
Reasonable values and reasonable practices were en-
tirely new words introduced into the theories of politi-
cal economy. Often my students, and sometimes my 
economist critics, said that "reasonable" was purely 
subjective, and that there were as many meanings of 
reasonableness as there were individuals. Such a term 
placed the determination of reasonableness in the arbi-
trary mind of whatever individual happened to be in 
16
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authority. But I considered this objection to be an in-
heritance from the subjective individualism of preced-
ing economic theorists. A collectivist theory of value 
derived from existing best practices, from custom, the 
common law, and the decisions of courts, could make 
reasonableness "objective" and therefore capable of in-
vestigation and testimony, leading to the formation of 
working rules for collective action in control of indi-
vidual action. . . . So I contended that, in economic con-
flicts, reasonable values and reasonable practices were 
not the subjective opinions of anybody, but were the col-
lective opinion, expressed in action, of those whose eco-
nomic interests were conflicting, but who investigated to-
gether, and knew by experience, all of the facts. 
Thus for Commons, objectivity was defined by the degree of 
social-legal consensus concerning "reasonable value." Objectiv-
ity — social objectivity — and the process of developing a rea-
sonable value were intertwined. In contrast, as argued by Me-
rino [1993, pp. 178-180], traditional accounting theorists' notion 
of objectivity was markedly distanced from the notion of reason-
able value in that they disclaimed any responsibility for value, 
and instead emphasized objective and documentable "natural" 
exchanges that largely involved transactions. Commons [1907b, 
p. 222] stated 
A significant feature of the Wisconsin legislation is . . . 
its reliance on the physical valuation as the first step in 
regulation (physical valuation means nothing more or 
less than the cost of construction or reconstruction of 
the physical property). Accompanied by a complete sys-
tem of uniform accounting with special precautions as 
to depreciation and construction accounts, every per-
son in the State may know at the end of each fiscal year 
exactly the rate of profit which each company or mu-
nicipality has made on the actual property invested. 
With the Wisconsin idea of physical valuation as the 
starting point, every citizen can determine for himself 
just as well as the Commission whether the rates and 
fares charged by the corporations are yielding an exces-
sive profit. 
In the U.S. Senate Hearings on the Physical Valuation of 
Property of Common Carriers [1913, pp. 90-91], whose purpose 
was to develop effective "natural" regulatory policy, Commons 
further defined his physical valuation approach as "an account-
ing proposition" which recognizes both the cost of the property 
17
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and a fair rate of return. Commons [U.S. Senate Hearings on the 
Physical Valuation of Property of Common Carriers, 1913, pp. 90-
91] acknowledged that while 
. . . corporations have devoted their property for the 
public use, and therefore during their history they were 
entitled to a fair rate of return . . . these valuations are 
very liberal, [but] they were all based consistently on 
the principle of cost rather than value, and therefore 
they represent the amount of sacrifice which investors 
have incurred for the service of the public.9 
During related Senate Hearings, a Senator Cummins chal-
lenged Commons on the point that Commons' physical valua-
tion approach actually permitted an excess of capitalization of 
railway property, thus allowing owners an excessive return on 
investment at the expense of customers. Following up on this 
theme, Senator Lippitt [U.S. Senate Hearings on the Physical 
Valuation of Property of Common Carriers, 1913, p. 108; empha-
sis added] criticized the physical valuation and rate-of-return 
approach by telling Commons that: 
You are making the National Government in that case a 
private nurse to the investing public, and when they 
(corporations) have been wise and enterprising and effi-
cient you are taking away their reward, but when they 
have been unwise and inefficient and negligent in busi-
ness, you are making it up to them, which may be good-
polity for the future, but it is not the case that prevailed in 
the past. 
Commons [1934, p. 125] later agreed, stating, "I am told by 
railway people that they feel confident that they will come out 
better than the public in this valuation problem." 
Wisconsin legislator Edward Bennett [1931, p. 1] was also 
critical of the Wisconsin Public Utility Law of 1907 and the dis-
cretionary nature of accounting within it because he felt that the 
bill "empowers the Commission to fix just and reasonable 
charges for services, [yet] leaves the citizen to search the law in 
vain for any statement of the policies and principles which are 
to be followed by the Commission in the determination of the 
reasonableness of the charges." Citing Section 196 of Wisconsin 
9
 This view is consistent with Ely's [1931, pp. 3-12] emphasis on the excel-
lence of the civil service in Germany where the government provides generous 
recognition of those who contribute to social and economic functioning. 
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Public Utility Law of 1907 as the one area where "the substance 
of everything which the law has to say about the principles of 
rate-making and valuation," Bennett [1931, p. 1] gave examples 
of the law: 
Paragraph 196.03. Utility charges to be reasonable and 
just. Every public utility is required to furnish reason-
ably adequate service and facilities. The charge made 
by any public utility . . . shall be reasonable and just, 
and every unjust or unreasonable charge for such ser-
vice is prohibited and declared unlawful. 
Paragraph 196.05. Utility property valuation. The Com-
mission shall value all the property of every public util-
ity actually used and useful for the convenience of the 
public. 
As Bennett [1931, pp. 2-3] argued, "The legislature empowers 
the Commission to fix just and reasonable rates but is silent, 
utterly silent as to the principles or the policies which are to be 
controlling in the determination of reasonableness". Commons 
[1907b, p. 223] agreed, stating 
Herein the law is elastic enough to offer the opportu-
nity for ingenuity and experiments that may combine 
the principle of State regulation with that of private 
initiative, thus circumventing the probable damaging 
effect of government regulation or enterprise and initia-
tive and on the investment of capital for extensions and 
improvements.10 
10
 This same critique of manipulability/subjectivity of accounting is evident 
in McGraw's [1984, p 31 ]criticism of earlier efforts by Charles Francis Adams to 
incorporate a "reasonable return" for the regulation of railroads in Massachu-
setts in the late nineteenth century: 
The Massachusetts approach (to rate regulation) rested on three pre-
mises, each of which could as well apply to twentieth-century utilities 
as to nineteenth-century railroads. First, any determination of the "rea-
sonableness" or "fairness" of rates must inescapably remain a subjective 
undertaking. Scientific precision in rate-setting is therefore a practical 
impossibility. Second, the pricing function is part of corporate manage-
ment, a function jealously guarded by all business executives, and with 
good reason. Third, the rate question directly reflects the debate over 
competition versus monopoly. In the case of nineteenth-century rail-
roads, rates were the means through which an impersonal market sig-
naled its ability or inability to cope with two conflicting forces: with the 
economic requirements of railroading in particular, and "natural mo-
nopoly" in general; and with the non-economic requirements imposed 
by society. 
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Thus, despite the appearance of being concrete, the abstract 
notion of rate of return as represented in the Wisconsin Public 
Utility Law of 1907 remained manipulatable by big business. 
Commons [1934, pp. 125-126] later attributed this result to the 
underlying nature of the political process employed in piecing 
together the legislation: 
In the negotiations leading up to the Public Utility Law 
of 1907, the joint legislative committee did not rely so 
much upon public hearings required by "due process of 
Law," where everybody has a lawful right to be heard 
and the conflicting opinions are [reconciled], as upon 
private and even confidential conferences with the lead-
ers of the interests to be brought under the law, where 
concessions could be made and the investigations of 
experts could be weighed and balanced. . . . It was the 
general class of negotiations which I afterwards defined 
as "rationing transactions" distinguished from manage-
rial and bargaining transactions. I could tell [before the 
enactment of the law] just how the Railroad Commis-
sion would administer and interpret the law. This fore-
knowledge enabled us to greatly condense the bill, leav-
ing a huge field of investigation and discretion to the 
Commission, instead of inserting into the law a multi-
tude of minute details, so familiar and so often conflict-
ing in American legislation. 
Despite the apparent motive to accommodate business in-
terests, one can argue that Commons' motive was more to strike 
a balance the powers of government and business. On this point, 
departing from such other pragmatists of the period as Ely's 
veneration of Germany, Commons [Democracy: The Best Basis 
for Reconstruction, Milwaukee Journal, July 28, 1918] observed 
that: 
We have learned in all democratic countries of the 
world one impor t an t lesson from the way which 
Germany's power has been built up and used. The 
democratic nations have learned to dread Socialism. 
Prussia is the modern exhibition of state Socialism. And 
government ownership of railways in Germany is prob-
ably the main instrument by which the power of autoc-
racy has been built up in that country. Other nations 
dread government railroads when controlled by autoc-
racy and military power, for it means that the railroad 
system can be used to dominate the business people, 
and to bring submission on the part of labor. 
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Commons thus saw the role of effective rate setting to be as 
much about preventing state governments from reducing the 
rates of utility companies to the point where the state actually 
runs the utility or defacto confiscates its property, as it is about 
protecting society from exploitive monopolies [Horwitz, 1992, 
pp. 145-167]. 
The Legacy of Reasonable Value: Constraint or Flexibility? 
While a precise rate percentage could in fact be set by the 
State under the rate of return approach, the income and asset 
base to which it applies could still be manipulated by utilities. 
For example, in their seminal economics work in the area, 
Averch and Johnson [1962, pp. 1052-1055] developed a model 
which suggests that because of the asset base used for determin-
ing prices, rate of return regulation actually encourages utilities 
to bias their input mix toward capital, i.e., by artificially increas-
ing the asset base, more money could be made at the established 
rate, with the increased cost passed on to consumers. Because of 
rate of return regulation, utility resources would be inefficiently 
allocated, thereby decreasing consumer welfare. Utility manag-
ers would also not be motivated to reduce expenses, thereby 
once more decreasing consumer welfare. Employing the agency 
theory perspective, this reasoning was supported by Abdel-
khalik, [1988, pp. 144-145] for example, who observed fully four 
score years after Commons' work that: 
Incentive problems arise in the electric utilities industry 
as a consequence of the institutional and legal arrange-
ments of the cost-plus pricing regime under which 
natural and statutory monopolies operate. In the United 
States, such monopolies operate under a cost recovery 
system that gives the firm a mechanism by which it can 
shift all or part of the cost of "moral hazard" risk to 
consumers, who then become the residual claimants. In 
this setting, expense accruals have a more direct link to 
the firm's cash flows than is the case in unregulated 
industries. In particular, pricing a monopolist's output 
at cost-plus means that accruing expenses generates 
sales revenues for utilities. Consequently, agency cost 
can be included in the allowable cost passed on to con-
sumers. The result is that the residual loss is shared 
between the consumers and shareholders with two 
competing consequences: (1) it would be in the best in-
terest of shareholders to provide managers with incen-
tives to shift all costs to the consumers; and, by the 
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same token, (2) it would be in the consumers' interest 
to persuade regulators to challenge the cost assump-
tions underlying the firms' requests for revenue require-
ments [see also Sappington, 1980, pp. 363-370; and 
Baron and Myerson, 1982, pp. 911-915; who modified 
the general agency theory model to better reflect regu-
lated contexts]. 
Seeking to understand whether managers serve sharehold-
ers or consumers, as influenced in their compensation systems, 
Abdel-khalik conducted an empirical examination of the U.S. 
utility industry. Consistent with Averch and Johnson's [1962, 
pp. 1059-1065] theorizing, he found that after controlling for the 
effects of size, the "padding" of operating costs and over capi-
talization are, indeed, associated with higher manager compen-
sation. Thus, utility managers are actually rewarded for passing 
on cost inefficiencies to consumers. But, would the paradox 
have been a revelation to Commons? 
According to McGraw [1984, pp. 59-60], it was generally 
recognized in the Progressive era that there arose interpretive 
problems and internal instabilities in actually applying the con-
cept of reasonable rate. A cost-plus formula relies on assets (be-
fore or after depreciation), on operating costs (included or not 
included), and asset valuation procedures (market, book, etc.). 
All of these possibilities lead to various incentive problems, as 
McGraw [1984, p. 60] concludes: 
In practice, these problems promoted the rise of inge-
nious accounting methods by corporations, all calcu-
lated to maximize revenues in the face of regulatory 
limits of percentage rates of return. At worst, they made 
the process of rate regulation a ritualistic charade, 
played out in the form of full-scale "rate-cases" as part 
of the routine operations of commissions. Such cases 
conducted under elaborate procedural laws, often 
turned into extremely laborious hearings dominated by 
lawyers and engineers, incomprehensible to the ordi-
nary citizen. 
Maxwell concurred with McGraw's [1956, p. 202] observation, 
stating: 
In spite of the Progressives' campaigns against mo-
nopoly, the administration unwittingly fostered mo-
nopoly in the process of regulating many public service 
corporations. Because the Railroad Commission lacked 
a yardstick for measuring unit costs, it tended to guar-
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antee a fair return and profit regardless of the efficiency 
or inefficiency of the operations of a power plant, water 
works, or street railway. The physical evaluation of 
properties was only a partial check against inefficiency 
and the trend was toward higher rates to compensate 
for rising costs. 
In contrast with other pragmatists of his era, Commons, 
overtly recognized the political nature of government adminis-
tration that socially constituted such regulations as the Wiscon-
sin Public Utility Law of 1907. Unlike others of his era who 
thought that the, "act of organization was intrinsically an ethical 
act vital to human nature and to society," [Hamilton and Sutton, 
1989, p. 15], Commons [1965, p. 109, emphasis added] had no 
illusion of the purity of the Wisconsin's bureaucratic structure 
nor of the neutrality of forms of accounting it deployed: 
Social organization is psychic, and consists of those co-
ercive sanctions which subordinate individuals to a 
single will, notwithstanding their inclinations to satisfy 
their desires at cross purposes in their own private 
ways. Organization is not originally the free persuasive 
grouping of men for mutual satisfaction, but is an alter-
native forced upon them by increasing population and 
increasing struggle for existence. Upon the utilitarian 
explanation, organization would be immoral , for it 
tends to suppress the individual to the passions of a 
few. As it is, organization is neither moral nor immoral 
— simply necessary. 
Thus, Commons saw monopolies as not "natural," but "arti-
ficial" in character, and their regulation by state governance 
structures that employed accounting as necessary, however 
flawed. Yet, the use of accounting did ostensibly exhibit the 
values of rationality, neutrality, objectivity, economy and con-
trol, but these values were inherently interpenetrated with con-
flict between opposing interest groups seeking to control the 
bureaucratic structure of government. Specifically, Commons 
saw even accounting concepts he himself advocated as inher-
ently flawed. For example, he saw market value and reproduc-
tion cost as circular as applied by the courts in trying to ascer-
tain what was "reasonable." According to Horwitz [1992, p.162]: 
[Commons'] penetrating — though often obscure — Le-
gal Foundations of Capitalism [1924] traced the late 
nineteenth century judicial shift to a market value stan-
dard. The Rate Cases, in particular, allowed Commons 
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to appreciate that it was the guarantee of a future in-
come stream that determined present value of property. 
'All value is expectancy' Commons proclaimed. In rate 
making cases, market value is the present value of ex-
pected rates. If the rates are unreasonable, so is the 
market value. Judges who believed that reasonable 
rates could be deduced from fair market value were 
"reasoning in a circle," Commons declared. 
Theoretical Interpretation 
March and Olsen [1983, pp. 265-295] offered a framework 
useful in understanding this apparent paradox of power and 
politics embedded within institutional economics, such as evi-
denced in the regulatory reform efforts undertaken by Com-
mons under La Follette's direction. They reasoned that such re-
form efforts were symbolic events which represented a history 
and embodiment of two forms of political rhetoric. The first, or 
"orthodox administration" form, represents the official language 
of laws and regulations which promote reorganization, and 
speaks in terms of managerial leadership, administrative struc-
tures and procedures for facilitating efficiency and effectiveness 
within bureaucratic structures. It invokes the overall guidelines 
and values of rationality, neutrality, objectivity, economy and 
control. 
But here, a paradox of bureaucratic action arises: If the 
impersonal, bureaucratic machinery of rationality is allowed to 
proceed unchecked, this very rationality would become unre-
sponsive to shifting human values and hence potentially abusive 
in the exercise of bureaucratic power. Thus, the second form of 
rhetoric, "realpolitik," arises, which holds that bureaucrat ic 
structures and claims to neutrality, objectivity and rationality 
represent dangerous illusions and threats to the governed unless 
they are linked somehow with the values, beliefs and goals of 
the populace and its various constituent groups. Thus, real-
politik recognizes the value of conflict between opposing inter-
est groups which seek expression though and control of the 
bureaucratic structure of government. Politics becomes stylized 
or encoded within the litany of bureaucratic structure, as in 
Commons' case — in the form of accounting rhetoric. More 
specifically, March and Olsen [1983, p. 283] observed that 
The rhetoric of realpolitik is an empirical and prescrip-
tive counterpoint to an orthodox administrative per-
spective. To the emphasis on managerial control, it jux-
24
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 22 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss1/2
Covaleski, Dirsmith, and Samuel: The Impact of John R. Commons 25 
taposes an emphasis on political control. It argues that 
a single individual has neither the cognitive capacity, 
nor the time and energy, nor the moral and representa-
tional standing assumed by the [orthodox administra-
tion] perspective. 
March and Olsen went on to observe that most political 
actors, and in the case of Commons, academic/administrative 
actors, recognize and even can recite either form of rhetoric 
when necessary, and taken together, these two forms establish a 
fairly exhaustive frame of reference for understanding bureau-
cratic structure and action in American government. March and 
Olsen [1983, pp. 291-92] concluded that while they are fairly 
exhaustive, the two forms of rhetoric are not mutually exclusive, 
but rather are interpenetrated: 
Such a perspective may provide an interpretation of the 
cultural ritual of reorganization and of the rhetorical 
duality of that ritual. The rhetoric of administration 
and the rhetoric of realpolitik are mutually supporting 
and are embedded in a culture in which each is impor-
tant. The ritual of reorganization is a reminder of both 
sets of beliefs and testimony to their efficacy. On the 
one hand, a commitment to administrative purity is 
made tolerable by an appreciation of realpolitik, much 
as a commitment to personal purity is made tolerable 
by an appreciation of human weakness. At the same 
time, a commitment to realpolitik rhetoric is made con-
sistent with human hopes by a faith in the imaginability 
of improvement through human intelligence. It should 
not be surprising to find that both rhetorics survive and 
thrive, and that both find expression in the symbols of 
reorganization. The orthodoxy of administration is the 
voice of the prologue to comprehensive administrative 
reform; the orthodoxy of realpolitik is the voice of the 
epilogue; the myths of the first shade into the myths of 
the second over the course of a major effort at reorgani-
zation; and both sets of myths are needed for a norma-
tively proper interpretation of the reorganization saga. 
. . . [These] rhetorics exhibit and reaffirm fundamental 
social values, particularly those associated with per-
sonal efficacy, with intention, interest, power and ratio-
nal choice. 
March and Olsen [1983, p. 291] urged that the two rhetorics not 
be interpreted as deceits for subverting public attention and di-
verting public resources, but rather as symbols of the possibility, 
the hope for effective government reform. 
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It appears that among the pragmatists at least Commons 
was well aware of the covertly political attributes of specific, 
accounting-based techniques he himself advocated. Consistent 
with other institutional economists [e.g., Dewey, 1910, 1922; 
Veblen, 1904, 1919], Commons did criticize the "pecuniary cal-
culus of accounting" [see Merino, 1993, pp. 164-165]. But in 
addition, Commons also redirected accounting and deployed it 
in support of government intervention vis-a-vis regulation. Here, 
accounting performed two roles. First accounting was deployed 
in the hope of making the private public by rendering the inner 
workings of such monopolies as utilities transparent to regula-
tors. And second, accounting rendered conflicts of interest as 
discursive affairs as compared to physical conflict in the form of 
boycotts, picket lines and armed Pinkerton agents typical of the 
era. This use of accounting aided in bringing confrontations 
from street and rail-level violence to the negotiating table 
[McGraw, 1984, pp. 77-93]. More specifically, exhibiting marked 
reflexivity, Commons [1965, pp. 99-100; emphasis added] as-
serted that: 
The State is primarily coercive, but where technical 
work has been absorbed by it, just as its officials must 
be equipped in knowledge and skill, they must also 
learn tact. Penology, pedagogy, "scientific" charity, are 
highly successful only when the iron hand of coercion is 
gloved by the arts of persuasion. The state extracts coer-
cion from private hands in order that the latter may be 
compelled to rely on persuasion, and the criterion for 
the success of state coercion itself is the extent to which 
the officials have learned to make it unnecessary. The 
state is, indeed, becoming more persuasive and less co-
ercive in proportion as the officials recognize their posi-
tion as public servants, and the people become upright 
and patriotic in character. 
Thus, accounting is not only an instrument for representing an 
economic reality as proposed by proprietary theorists, but also a 
rhetorical device for setting forth the concept of reasonable 
value which makes rage, coercion, physical force, unreasonable. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The analysis provided in this paper suggests that the contri-
butions of John R. Commons in the development of accounting 
in the governance structure of the state and the regulation of 
monopolies is underrepresented within extant academic ac-
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counting literature. More specifically, Commons' work in Wis-
consin, which spread to other states and the federal govern-
ment, appears to be important to understanding and making 
possible state governance, and this governance in turn, makes 
accounting and accountants possible. Harter [1962, pp. 210-212] 
concluded that while Commons is comparatively obscure in 
American history, his leadership in the drafting and adoption of 
social legislation entitles him to more attention than he has so 
far received. Harter [1962, p . 128] further states that "No single 
man was responsible in bringing it (social legislation) about, but 
if anyone could be called its father, he would be John R. Com-
mons." Similarly, Horwitz [1992, p. 162] observes that "The first 
thinker to see the relationship between the de-physicalization of 
property and its abstraction into market value [key concepts 
within accounting theory] was the great Wisconsin institutional 
economist John R. Commons." Commons' legacy is still very 
apparent as seen in recent efforts to deregulate the utilities in-
dustry: 
"We're cutting through 100 years of sedimentary layers 
in trying to make the market for power work better," 
said Gary J. Lavine, senior vice president at the Niagara 
Mohawk Power Corporation in Syracuse. . . . The cen-
tral quandry is that much of the existing investment in 
electrical power . . . is more expensive than the cost of 
starting over with a clean sheet of paper. As a result, 
utilities contend, the only way to provide big electricity 
savings quickly would be to deny investors a fair return 
on hundreds of billions of dollars of financial commit-
ments that with hindsight should never have been 
made. That, they say, would be unconscionable. . . . 
"Regulators made promises to investors, and govern-
ment has a moral obligation to honor them," said 
Alfred E. Kahn, an economist at Cornell University 
[New York Times, 2/3/95, p. C1]. 
The work of John Commons has an interrelated theme with 
that of DR Scott [1931, p. 133], who suggested that the develop-
ment of accounting " . . . must be provided for within the process 
of cultural change . . ." thereby emphasizing the importance of 
such issues as: the social creation of accounting; how alternative 
sets of meaning are attributed to accounting; and the presence 
and influence of competing interest groups within organizations 
and society who differentially deploy accounting to serve their 
own vested interests. Scott [1931, p. 264], for example, called 
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attention to accounting being complicit in the creation of orga-
nizational managers ' reality, both in terms of determining the 
goals of management as well as the means to achieving those 
goals; he stated "Accounting and statistical methods are serving 
as vehicles of the current cultural reorganization because of 
their limitation of expression to objective terms" [see also Ijiri, 
1967, pp. 158-159]. 
Similarly, as March [1987, pp. 38-40; emphasis added] ob-
served in a plenary speech before the American Accounting As-
sociation: 
These components of decisions and decision processes 
are not unfortunate manifestations of an irrational cul-
ture. They are important aspects of the way organiza-
tions develop the common culture and vision that be-
come primary mechanisms for effective action, control 
and innovation. As a result, information strategies are 
as much strategies for managing, interpreting and cre-
ating visions as they are strategies for clarifying deci-
sions. And if this sometimes seems perverse, it may be 
well to remind ourselves that human life is, in many 
ways, less a collection of choices than a mosaic of inter-
pretations. It involves both discovering reality and con-
structing it. 
Thus, there appears to be a core appreciation among the 
loosely defined group of institutional economists that political 
rationalization vis-a-vis economic rationalization became the 
means of attaining both order in the economic sphere and secu-
rity in the political arena [Scott, 1931, pp. 34-61]. On this point, 
Hopwood [1990a, pp. 83-88; 1990b, pp. 10-16] has argued that 
accounting is centrally implicated in the institutional frame-
works, language and patterns of power and influence that char-
acterize contemporary organizations. It follows that accounting 
practices evolved in a manner which involves more than merely 
formulating and legitimizing economic actions, but also in pre-
serving the status quo vis-a-vis power of specific business and 
political actors. The power of accounting derives from its ability 
to move beyond merely facilitating the operation of pre-given 
and relatively unproblematic forms of economic management, 
such that accounting categories take on a visible, rule-like status 
in social thought and action, thus transcending even social and 
political considerations. Consequently, research interest in ac-
counting should not be conceived as purely a technical one of 
improving its ability to passively represent an objective eco-
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nomic reality, but also stands for much broader issues by which 
patterns of power and influence are developed and maintained 
as they concern the nexus linking the organization with society. 
As Scott argued, such rationalized administrative policies and 
practices as accounting did not emerge as a consequence of 
widespread concern for operational efficiency, but as an artifact 
of the power nexus linking economic and political spheres of 
influence. 
Commons' use of accounting as an orthodox administration 
form of rhetoric, and his role in developing it as influenced by 
the rhetoric of realpolitik [March and Olsen, 1983, pp. 285-295], 
was essentially reflexive in nature. That is, as an external critic 
of monopolies, he challenged such general concepts as account-
ing profits as aligned with socially dysfunctional behavior. He 
was also cognizant of the flaws in specific techniques he himself 
developed as being subject to influence by vested business inter-
ests, that his rate of return remained "elastic" and "manipulable" 
by the very monopolies to which it was applied. However, he 
saw such calculative practices of governmental regulations as a 
necessary aspect of a modern, organization-based society. As 
March and Olsen [1983, p. 292] suggest: 
[Our] observation is that governance is an interpre-
tation of life and an affirmation of legitimate values 
and institutions. In a society that emphasizes rational-
ity, self interest, and efficacy, politics honors adminis-
trative and realpolitik rhetoric, it provides symbolic and 
ritual confirmation of the possibility of meaningful in-
dividual and collective action. The argument is not that 
symbols [such as the ra t iona l i ty and objectivi ty 
achieved through accounting] are important to politics, 
although they certainly are. Rather, the argument is the 
reverse — that politics is important to symbols, that a 
primary contribution of politics to life is in the develop-
ment of meaning. It is not necessary to decide here 
whether decision making and the allocation of re-
sources are symbols and the construction of meaning 
are more fundamental. They are heavily intertwined, 
and discussion of primacy may obscure that fact. But 
itseems unlikely that a theory of governance can repre-
sent or improve the phenomena of governing without 
including the ways political institutions, rhetoric, and 
the rituals of decisions facilitate the maintenance and 
change of social values and the interpretation of human 
existence. 
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Thus, accounting as a symbol of rationality, efficiency and 
science within state governance came to be politically consti-
tuted as opposed to being solely the product of rational actions 
and events within the private sector. That Commons' "reason-
able value" and rate of return regulation impacted accounting 
and economic thought is attested to by its use in regulating 
utilities for most of this century and by research in economics 
and accounting probing its efficacy for over eighty years [illus-
trative are Averch and Johnson, 1962, pp. 1052-1055; Sapping-
ton, 1983, pp. 363-370; Baron and Myerson, 1982, pp. 911-915; 
Abdel-khalik, 1988, pp. 44-62; Lanen and Larcker, 1992, pp. 71-
81]. 
To be sure, Commons recognized imperfections in the state 
apparatus in general and the techniques of regulators in particu-
lar, that there exists no universal truths as represented by eco-
nomic "laws" and accounting "facts." A "coping schizophrenic" 
[Campbell, 1970, pp. 1-23], he nevertheless continued to struggle 
with the paradoxes of his era. According to Hoksbergen [1994, 
p. 708]: 
On the one hand, there are what might be called 
extreme relativists, who upon the discovery that there is 
no objectively certain foundation for the true, the good, 
or the beautiful, jump to the conclusion that nothing 
matters. On the other hand, there are those who accept 
the demise of foundationalism and acknowledge the ex-
istence of many different traditions of understanding 
but still have a deep sense that it does matter, that there 
is meaning to our lives, and that we can continue the 
struggle to improve our understanding and our lives. I 
am persuaded by the latter position, and because the 
participants in the debate [such as John R. Commons] 
have cared enough to write down their thoughts on the 
issue, I presume they are persuaded, at least in practice, 
by that position too. 
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